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Abstract
Background: Worldwide, there is a wealth of literature examining patient-level risk factors for methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteraemia. At the hospital-level it is generally accepted that MRSA bacteraemia is
more common in larger hospitals. In Scotland, size does not fully explain all the observed variation among
hospitals. The aim of this study was to identify risk factors for the presence and rate of MRSA bacteraemia cases in
Scottish mainland hospitals. Specific hypotheses regarding hospital size, type and connectivity were examined.
Methods: Data from 198 mainland Scottish hospitals (defined as having at least one inpatient per year) were
analysed for financial year 2007-08 using logistic regression (Model 1: presence/absence of MRSA bacteraemia) and
Poisson regression (Model 2: rate of MRSA bacteraemia). The significance of risk factors representing various
measures of hospital size, type and connectivity were investigated.
Results: In Scotland, size was not the only significant risk factor identified for the presence and rate of MRSA
bacteraemia. The probability of a hospital having at least one case of MRSA bacteraemia increased with hospital
size only if the hospital exceeded a certain level of connectivity. Higher levels of MRSA bacteraemia were associated
with the large, highly connected teaching hospitals with high ratios of patients to domestic staff.
Conclusions: A hospital’s level of connectedness within a network may be a better measure of a hospital’s risk of
MRSA bacteraemia than size. This result could be used to identify high risk hospitals which would benefit from
intensified infection control measures.
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Background
Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) have been an
unwanted aspect of healthcare systems for several de-
cades. Staphylococcus aureus is a common pathogen as-
sociated with HAIs which results in a spectrum of
clinical conditions ranging from mild and often self-
limiting skin and soft tissue infections to more serious
illnesses including bacteraemia, pneumonia and toxic
shock syndrome. Despite representing only a small pro-
portion of all symptomatic S. aureus infections, S. aureus
bacteraemias (SAB) have a disproportionate impact on
the burden of disease owing to their high associated
mortality rates from life-threatening complications such
as infective endocarditis and metastatic infections [1].
Therefore, SAB is considered a manifestation of serious
disease and of high clinical importance. Furthermore,
when methicillin-resistant S.aureus (MRSA) is the causa-
tive agent of these bacteraemias, the risk of treatment
failure and mortality is greater, with increased costs of
managing these patients [2–4].
Implementing effective infection control measures to
reduce the number of cases and the nosocomial spread
of the bacteria has been a priority in recent years, with
measures including enhanced surveillance and infection
control policies, as well as government targets. In order
to design successful and targeted intervention programs,
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risk factor analyses are often carried out to identify be-
haviours and characteristics associated with transmis-
sion, morbidity and mortality. Much of the literature on
risk factors for MRSA bacteraemia infections has been
performed at the patient-level, identifying characteristics
such as previous hospitalisation, recent antimicrobial
therapy, indwelling vascular devices, prior invasive or
surgical procedures, often within risk groups including
the elderly and those with latent health conditions [5–7].
Patient-level characteristics, however, do not fully ex-
plain the observed heterogeneity in the numbers of
MRSA bacteraemia cases among hospitals. It has been
suggested that hospital size is associated with the
hospital-level incidences [8, 9], however, recent research
suggests that size may not be not the only factor [8–13].
Hospital connectedness (or connectivity) through shared
transfer patients, was found to influence MRSA bacter-
aemia incidences [8, 10, 12, 13]. Hospital type and hence
the procedures that would be carried out in such facil-
ities was also previously found to be an important
hospital-level risk-factor [8, 9].
The aim of this study was to determine whether hos-
pital connectivity and hospital type significantly influ-
ence hospital-level MRSA bacteraemia morbidity rates
in mainland Scottish hospitals once hospital size has
been accounted for. Our approach was twofold; firstly to
identify risk factors for the presence of MRSA bacter-
aemia in all Scottish mainland hospitals and then for
General hospitals only, to identify risk factors for high
rates of MRSA bacteraemia. Controlling the spread of
MRSA bacteraemia depends on knowledge of where the
bulk of disease burden lies and understanding why infec-
tions occur where they do.
Methods
Hospital selection
Initially all 264 facilities listed in the financial year 2007-08
Information Services Division (ISD) cost book reports
(R020 and R020LS, http://www.isdscotlandarchive.
scot.nhs.uk/isd/6058.html) were considered. For the
purposes of analysis, a hospital was defined as a secon-
dary healthcare facility with at least one inpatient per
year and with at least one hospital specialty (previously
known as departments). Hospitals from island Health
Boards (NHS Shetland, NHS Orkney and NHS Western
Isles) were excluded since hospitals there were consi-
dered atypical and not comparable to other ‘mainland’
hospitals included in the study as connectivity is diffi-
cult to assess. This resulted in 198 National Health
Service (NHS) hospitals being included in the study for
the financial year 2007-08 (Fig. 1) and 66 facilities being
excluded.
Data collection
(1) Case data. Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA)
bacteraemia case data by hospital for the financial year
2007-08 (6 April 2007 – 5 April 2008) were received
from Health Protection Scotland (HPS). This financial
year was chosen because at the time it was the only year
for which data were available for all risk factors (hospital
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Fig. 1 Map of Mainland Scotland with NHS Health Boards. Circles show the 198 hospitals included in this study for the financial year 2007–2008.
Each circle represents one hospital and hospitals are colour coded by type (pink, Teaching; green, General (no teaching); grey (Other). a. Number
of cases per hospital is continuous (ranging from 0–72) and the size of circle represents the number of cases with increasing number of cases
illustrated by increasingly larger circles. The legend highlights the size of a circle that represents 0, 20, 40 and 60 cases. b. Hospital size (Occupied
Bed Days (OBD)) is continuous (ranging from 990–322494) and the size of circle represents the number of OBD with increasing OBD illustrated by
increasingly larger circles. The legend highlights the size of a circle that represents 100,000, 200,000 and 300,000 OBD. c. Connectivity (Indegree) is
continuous (ranging from 0–70) and the size of circle represents the connectivity with increasing connectivity illustrated by increasingly larger
circles. The legend highlights the size of a circle that represents Connectivity of 0, 20, 40 and 60
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size, type and connectivity). (2) Risk factors. Data of po-
tential risk factors were obtained from Information Ser-
vices Division (ISD) for each hospital for the financial
year 2007-08 (a full list of variables in Additional file 1).
As the aim was to test specific hypotheses regarding the
effect of hospital size, type and connectivity; the majority
of the data that were obtained represent different mea-
sures of those characteristics. Although various other
measures including average occupancy rate, total num-
ber of whole time equivalent (medical and dentistry,
nursing and midwifery, domestic, and support services)
staff, patient-staff ratios (number of patients to medical
and dentistry, nursing and midwifery, domestic, and sup-
port services staff ), and cleaning by hospital size were
considered (Additional file 1). (2a) Hospital size. Mea-
sures of size included occupied bed days (OBD), surface
area (m2), average staffed beds, total inpatients dis-
charged, total staff members and others (Additional file
1). (2b) Hospital type. ISD group Scottish into the fol-
lowing categories: Category A (General (mainly acute)
including Teaching (A1), large General (A2), General
(A3), and Sick children’s (A4)); Category B (Long stay),
Category C (Mental); Category D (psychiatry of learning
difficulties); Category E (Maternity); and Category J
(Community). Information on the presence and absence
of 46 specialties was also acquired. For a complete list of
these specialties see Additional file 2. (2c) Connectivity.
To quantify movements of patients between hospitals,
patient admission data were obtained from ISD. The pa-
tient admission data covered all admissions to healthcare
facilities in Scotland for the calendar year 2007 (1 Janu-
ary – 31 December 2007). From this dataset the move-
ments of all patients between hospitals were extracted
either as direct transfers, i.e. from one hospital directly
to another hospital, or as indirect transfers, i.e. when a
patient was discharged from one hospital into the com-
munity and subsequently (within the period covered by
the data) admitted to another hospital. From these data,
a movement matrix was derived for all connected hospi-
tals in Scotland [11] and then various summary mea-
sures of hospital connectivity were generated (Table 1).
Statistical analysis
Descriptive analyses were carried out to describe hos-
pital type and the number of cases per hospital. Several
variables were log10(x + 1) transformed to correct for
non-normal distribution of the data while others were
categorised. A full list of all 39 explanatory variables is
shown in Additional file 1. The hospital connectivity var-
iables were examined as both continuous and categorical
variables. Cut-off levels of connectivity variables were
determined using Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve analysis [14], above which hospitals were
considered positive for MRSA bacteraemia. The cut-off
chosen was one that maximised the sum of the sensitiv-
ity and specificity. Confidence intervals (25th and 75th
percentiles) for the cut-off values were generated from
10,000 bootstrap simulations. Data regarding hospital
specialties (n = 46) were summarised using nonmetric
multi-dimensional scaling (NMS) in order to reduce the
number of variables. The NMS was performed in PC-
ORD version 6.08 (MJM software Design, Gleneden
Beach, OR) using the 36 specialties that were sufficiently
represented across all hospitals (i.e. present in at least
5 % of the hospitals, therefore 10 specialties were ex-
cluded from this analysis). Multi-response Permutation
Procedures (MRPP) analysis [15] was used a posteriori
to test the hypothesis of no difference between hospital
status (presence/absence of MRSA bacteraemia) and
hospital type (Category A, B, C, D, E, J).
Table 1 Summary of connectivity measures
Name Definition Cut-off Percentilesa pb
Patients in Total number of patients
moving to this hospital
from other hospitals adjusted
by number of staffed beds
3.61 3.26–4.09 <0.001
Indegree Number of hospitals that
transferred patients to this
hospital [11]
11 6–25 <0.001
Outdegree Number of hospitals that
receive patients from this
hospital [11]
8 8–12 <0.001
Closeness centrality Normalized measure of
the centrality of a node
in a network based on the
mean length of all shortest
paths from that node
to every other reachable
node in the network. [24]
0.3898 0.3898–0.3915 <0.001
afrom 10,000 bootstrap simulations
bFisher’s exact test
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For both the single variable and multivariable analyses,
two models were considered. Model 1 was a logistic regres-
sion model with binomial distribution fitted to presence-
absence data for all hospitals (n = 198) to identify risk fac-
tors for having cases versus not. Model 2 was a generalised
linear model with a Poisson distribution fitted to count
data, offset by the logarithm of OBD, to identify risk factors
associated with higher rates of MRSA bacteraemia in Gen-
eral (Category A) hospitals only (n = 38). A multiplicative
over dispersion parameter was added to address over dis-
persion in the Poisson model.
A hypothesis driven approach to model selection was
performed. Before undertaking the multivariable analysis,
groups of variables representing hospital size, connectivity
and hospital type were examined individually in a single
variable analysis. As size was viewed a priori as important, a
size-related variable was entered into the model first. With
size in the model, variables associated with connectedness
and hospital type were tested, including interactions.
Likelihood-ratio tests and the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) were used to select the most parsimonious model.
Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05. Unless otherwise
stated all analyses were carried out using Proc Glimmix in
SAS version 9.3.1 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
General epidemiology
Figure 1a-c and Additional file 3 shows the 198 hospitals
with respect to the number of MRSA bacteraemia cases
(Fig. 1a), hospital size (Fig. 1b) and connectivity (Inde-
gree) (Fig. 1c). Hospitals are colour coded by “type” as
defined by the NMS analysis. The majority of hospitals
(n = 152, 77 %) reported no MRSA bacteraemia cases
(Fig. 1a). The remaining 46 hospitals reported 662
MRSA bacteraemia cases in total (range 0-72). From
these 662 cases, 47 cases died from all-cause mortality
within 30 day, giving a 30-day case-fatality ratio of 7.1 %.
Single variable analysis of risk factors
Figure 1b shows the distribution of MRSA bacteraemia
cases with respect to hospital size. Hospitals were ranked
by size, as measured by occupied bed days. Hospital size
was a statistically significant predictor of the presence of
cases (p < 0.001) and number of cases in General hospi-
tals (p < 0.001).
Table 1 shows the best cut-off levels for the connectiv-
ity measures identified using ROC curve analysis. For all
cut-offs found, hospitals above the threshold were at sig-
nificantly increased risk for the presence of MRSA bac-
teraemia (Table 1).
Figure 2 shows the results of NMS of the specialties
for the 198 hospitals included in this study. Two signifi-
cant axes explained a total of 83.9 % of the variation in
the data. NMS axis 1 which explains 78.7 % of the vari-
ation, significantly separated hospitals with and without
MRSA (MRPP, p < 0.001). Progression along NMS Axis
1 was associated with an increasing number of MRSA
bacteraemia cases, increasing hospital size (OBD) and an
Fig. 2 Results of nonmetric multidimensional scaling (NMS) of the specialties (n = 36) for the 198 hospitals included in this study. Two significant
axes explain a total of 83.9 % of the variation in the data with NMS axis 1 explaining 78.7 %, representing an increasing number of MRSA cases,
increasing hospital size (OBD), and an increasing number of total specialties. 80 % confidence ellipses drawn to designate significant groups
based on hospital type: Teaching (Category A1; n = 6), General, no teaching (Category A2, A3, A4; n = 32) and Other (Categories B, C, D, E,
J; n = 160)
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increasing number of specialties. Three significantly
(MRPP, p < 0.001) different hospital groups were identi-
fied, distributed along NMS Axis 1 (Fig. 2). The “Other”
group corresponds to the ISD hospital designated cat-
egories B, C, D, E, J. Hospitals designated “Other” were
at lower risk than General Hospitals with no Teaching
(Categories A2, A3, A4) which in turn had a lower risk
than Teaching hospitals (Category A1). In general,
Teaching hospitals were the largest, most connected and
had the highest number of MRSA cases (Fig. 1a-c).
Multivariable analysis of risk factors
Model 1: Risk factors for presence of MRSA bacteraemia
cases (n = 198 hospitals). Results showed (Fig. 3) that the
probability of a hospital having at least one MRSA bac-
teraemia case increased with hospital size (log10OBD),
particularly for hospitals that exceeded the threshold for
the connectivity variable Indegree (Log10OBD*Indegree
threshold p = 0.05; odds ratio (95%CI): 136 (7- > 999)).
Model 2: Risk factors for higher rates of MRSA bacter-
aemia (n = 38 hospitals). After adjusting for size, results
showed (Table 2) that the Indegree (number of hospitals
that transferred patients to a given hospital), being a
teaching hospital and the ratio of patients-to-domestic
staff were all significant predictors of the level of MRSA
bacteraemia in General hospitals. For each hospital
sending at least one patient (Indegree), there is a 3 % in-
crease in the expected number of MRSA cases per OBD.
The expected number of MRSA bacteraemia cases per
OBD is 64 % higher in teaching than non-teaching hos-
pitals. Higher ratios of patients to domestic staff is asso-
ciated with a 28 % increase in the expected number of
MRSA cases per OBD for a 10 fold increase in the ratio,
corresponding to a 2.8 % increase for a 26 % increase in
the ratio (Table 2).
Discussion
In this study, data on MRSA bacteraemia were obtained
for all Scottish mainland hospitals, defined as a second-
ary healthcare facility with at least one inpatient per year
and with at least one hospital specialty. Only 23 % of the
hospitals examined in this study reported at least one
case of MRSA bacteraemia. This proportion was small
however; the hospital definition included long stay, men-
tal and community hospitals which were typically small
facilities, providing very few specialties. In general, hos-
pitals that reported at least one case of MRSA bacter-
aemia over the study period were large hospitals.
However, even large hospitals rarely had large numbers
of reported MRSA bacteraemia cases unless they were
also well connected to the wider hospital network. For
all connectivity measures generated in this study, there
seemed to be a cut-off below which a hospital had no or
lower MRSA bacteraemia cases than expected from a
model that included size alone. Although further testing
would be required, such a measure is highly useful in
identifying hospitals at high risk for MRSA bacteraemia
(and potentially other HAIs) and could direct where to
concentrate surveillance efforts at a national level.
Hospital connectivity was also a significant risk factor
in the level of MRSA bacteraemia observed in General
hospitals thus providing further evidence that size alone
cannot fully predict a hospital’s MRSA bacteraemia sta-
tus. Connectivity has also been found to be an important
risk factor for the spread of nosocomial or antibiotic-
resistant pathogens in other studies [8, 10, 11, 13] and
described in a recent review [16]. Well-connected hospi-
tals received volumes of transfer patients from several
other facilities. Previous studies have shown that transfer
patients have a comparatively higher risk of nosocomial
infection than non-transferred patients owing to differ-
ent demographics, health status at time of transfer (often
acutely unwell and critical) and other patient-level risk
characteristics [12].
When examining hospital type, Teaching hospitals
were highlighted as having a large number of MRSA
bacteraemia cases. Teaching hospitals are large, well
connected and have a high number of specialties.
High patient-to-staff ratios were also identified as a
risk factor for higher levels of MRSA bacteraemia.
Patient-to-staff ratio of domestic workers was used
as a proxy measure for the ratio of patients to clean-
ing staff. Hospital cleaning remains a vital strategy
for effective infection control which was highlighted
by this small but significant risk from our model.
This result, however, supports the previously re-
ported effect of heightened hygiene awareness and
enhanced cleaning on reducing the number of new
infections and microbial contamination of the hos-
pital [13, 17–19].
Fig. 3 Probability of a hospital having at least one case of MRSA
bacteraemia for hospitals above (red line, n = 56) and below (blue
line, n = 142) the Indegree threshold (Table 1)
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This study has some important limitations that must
be considered. Our definition of a hospital was intended
to capture facilities with overnight patients receiving
medical care. Nursing homes were excluded since not all
patients would be receiving medical care, the demo-
graphics and risk factors of patients would likely differ
from true hospitals, and nursing homes operate in a dif-
ferent way to hospitals. Nursing homes are thought to
harbour a substantial number of S. aureus colonisations
and infections are therefore likely to be an important
reservoir for hospital infections [20–23]. In addition, this
study only used a single year of data. However, almost
90 % of the hospitals had the same status (either MRSA
bacteraemia positive or negative) over the 5 years (finan-
cial years 2006-07 to 2010-11) for which data were avail-
able. There were three hospitals that were only positive
for the year of this study. All models were run with and
without these hospitals with no change in the results.
The same applies to the hospital network; there were no
changes in the network over the studied period. Al-
though there may be day-to-day variation in connections
between hospitals, the network is stable when measured
over longer periods (van Bunnik, personal communica-
tion). Lastly, since we did not have information on indi-
vidual level risk factors we could not take these into
account in the models presented in this paper. However,
future models should ideally take into account both indi-
vidual level effects and hospital level effects to identify a
complete set of risk factors for the presence of MRSA
bacteraemia cases in Scottish hospitals.
Conclusion
This is the first Scotland-wide study utilising hospital-
level characteristics to examine differences in MRSA
bacteraemia morbidity among hospitals. This study
showed that 23 % of Scottish mainland hospitals re-
ported cases of MRSA bacteraemia. Effort to control
MRSA bacteraemia should therefore be focused on large,
well-connected hospitals. Further research should be
conducted with respect to reducing the ratio of patients
to domestic staff as a means of reducing the levels of
MRSA bacteraemia infections, especially in teaching
hospitals where the levels are very high.
Health Protection Scotland (HPS) and Scottish
Government prioritise the implementation of effective
infection control measures to reduce the spread of
pathogens in nosocomial settings. Mandatory enhanced
surveillance for all S. aureus was introduced in Scotland
in 2014. Programmes that prevent MRSA bacteraemia
transmission will likely be relevant to other epidemiolo-
gically important healthcare pathogens that spread by
patient-to-patient transmission. Here, we presented a
study that adds to existing literature since our multivari-
ate models could readily be applied as public health
tools that estimate hospital-level risk of MRSA bacter-
aemia and that identify high risk hospitals in Scotland
which would benefit from intensified infection control
measures. With further investigation, the application
could potentially be extended to other HAIs and other
countries.
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Table 2 Model 2. Risk factors for higher rates of MRSA bacteraemia in General Scottish mainland hospitals (n = 38)
Variable Estimate (SE) p Risk Ratio (95 % CI)a
Indegree b 0.030 (0.007) <0.001 1.03 (1.02–1.05)
Teaching hospital 0.496 (0.168) 0.003 1.64 (1.18–2.28)
Ratio of patients to domestic staff 0.246 (0.076) 0.001 1.28 (1.10–1.48)
aRisk ratio and 95 % confidence intervals estimated using the modified Poisson Regression approach [25]
bMeasure of hospital connectivity
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